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A PEOPLES' EUROPE? 
EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
Dr. Jennifer M. Welsh 
Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute 
"We are not forming coalitions between States, 
but union among people." 
Jean Monnet 
Washington, 
1952 
As part of its mission to move beyond a purely "businessmen's 
Europe", the drafters of the recent Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union have for the first time attempted to define what it means to be 
a European citizen.1 \';rhis idea of citizenship is a relatively new one 
in Community parlance, given "that the agenda for integration has 
hitherto concerned itself mainly with the achievement of economic 
rather than political or cultural objectives. Moreover, the fact that the 
original Treaty of Rome refers to several "peoples" - and not a single 
one - suggests that it did not intend to create any supranational 
notion of European citizenship. Instead, the individual rights of 
citizenship were to remain within the competence of indivi.dual 
Member States.2 As a consequence, the evolution of European 
citizenship has been shaped by the more general tension within the 
Community between supra nationalism and intergovernmentalism, 
combining concrete rights which can be extrapolated from existing 
treaties with more general ideas of a common "European identity".3 
lThe process of constructing "'Peoples' Europe" actually began in 1985 with the publication of 
the Adonnino Report, commissioned by the Fontainebleau European Council. 
2Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe", Common Market Law Review, 26 (1989), 
595-614 (p. 596). Hence, citizens of a Member State were still regarded by the Treaty as aliens 
or foreigners by other Member States, and could suffer discrimination in those areas not covered 
by EC law. 
l 
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The result is a weak and ambiguous legal status which does little to 
reflect or develop a sense of shared goals and values among . 
European peoples. 
The Rights of Citizenship 
Before tracing the development of European citizenship, it is 
useful to consider the more established concept of state citizenship 
that has been discussed by political theorists, economists and 
sociologists. Citizenship has become an increasingly important 
subject for social scientists in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
for reasons existing both within and beyond the nation-state. 
External factors include the intensifying processes of globalization 
and modernization4, the increase in economic and cultural 
transnational connections among peoples, and the creation of 
international guarantees for the protection individual human rights.5 
Internally, citizenship has factored into debates concerning the 
growing crisis in the welfare state, the erosion of participatory 
democracy, the link between state and "civil society", and the 
jurisdictional power struggles between regional and central 
governments. 6 
In his now famous 1949 article, "Citizenship and Social Class", 
sociologist T.H. Marshall defines citizenship as a "status bestowed on 
those who are full members of a community."? Hence, though it is a 
status accorded to individuals, citizenship is a fundamentally social 
phenomenon, which has little meaning outside of a collective 
framework. More importantly, citizenship is an egalitarian symbol: 
all those who possess it enjoy de jure, if not de facto, equality with 
respect to its corresponding rights and duties.B in this sense, notes 
3carlos Closa, "The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union" Common Market 
Law Review, 29 (1992), 1137-1169 (p. 1139J. This paper will rely heavily on Closa for its legal 
analysis. 
4For a discussion of the link between globalization and citizenship, see Global Politics: 
Globalization and the Nation-State, edited by Anthony G. McGrew, Paul G. Lewis et al (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1992 ), Part IV. 
5The development of these guarantees is discussed by RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
6A.n overview of these current debates, with a particular emphasis on Britain can be found in 
Citizenship, edited by Geoff Andrews (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 199ll. 
7T.H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class", in Class, Citizenship and Social Development: 
.:ssays by T.H. Marshal! (London: University of Chicago Press, 1964J, 71-134 (p. 92J. 
Ibid. 
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political theorist David Held, citizenship is a particularly interesting 
concept, for it "combines in rather unusual ways the public and social 
with the individual aspects of political life .... Individual citizens enjoy 
entitlements on the basis of a fundamental equality of condition, 
which is their membership ofthe community."9 
In concrete terms, the rights of citizenship were originally 
translated as entitlement to equality under the law - what Marshall 
refers to as civil rights. This essentially "negative" conception of 
rights,10 particularly dominant in Enlightenment thinking, granted 
citizens a free space in which to pursue their individual goals without 
the risk of state interference. It therefore included the right to 
freedom of speech, the right to private property, and the access to 
legal process.11 Over time, however, it became clear that such rights 
were not necessarily exercised by all and that a negative 
interpretation of rights did not give citizens a sufficient degree of 
empowerment. While in theory there was equality before the law, in 
practice there were non legal barriers restricting the capacity to 
choose between different courses of action or to guarantee the 
possession of certain entitlements. As Marshall puts it: "A property 
right is not a right to possess property, but a right to acquire it, if you 
can, and to protect it, if you can get it."12 
Consequently, over the course of the nineteenth century, 
citizenship expanded to include the right to participate in the 
decision-making process. These political rights for the most part 
consisted of the right to vote and to stand for public office. In our 
own tw_entieth century, further "positive" rights have been added to 
the status of citizenship. Through the institutions of the modern 
welfare state, social rights (e.g., access to health care, education, and 
social services) have become part of the catalogue of citizenship 
entitlements in many nation-states of Europe. 
i~avid ~e~d, "~etween State and Civil Society: Citizenship", in Andrews, op.cit., 19-25 (p. 21). 
, The d1stmctwn between negative and positive liberty is made by Isaiah Berlin. 
1 ~ For a history of the development of citizenship rights in France, see Catherine Withol de 
Wenden, Citoyennete, Nationalite et Immigration (Arcantere: Paris, 1987). 
12Marshall, op.cit., p. 97. The same could be said for the rule oflaw: while in theory everyone 
has access to due process, in reality litigation is too costly for many individuals to pursue. 
l 
-4-
The Rise of European Citizenship 
Until very recently, the European Community did not assert 
such a substantive list of entitlements for individuals living within its 
boundaries. Indeed, the founding fathers of the European post-war 
order consciously avoided creating a relationship between the 
individual and the Community akin to that existing on a domestic 
level between the individual and the nation-state. If any concept of 
"Peoples' rights" motivated these engineers of European integration, 
it was a relatively embryonic one, based on civil notions such as the 
pre-eminence of law, respect for human rights and the equality of all 
Europeans. The first post-war European organisation, the Council of 
Europe (1949), was to be the incarnation of these general humanist 
principles.13 
Building on this legacy, the individual rights of European 
peoples implicit in the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent Single 
European Act were limited in scop.e, negative in character, and 
exercised by only a few. These civil and economic rights - such as 
free movement, non-discrimination, or the right to appeal to the 
European Court - were intended primarily to facilitate the completion 
of the common market. Similarly, while rudimentary political rights 
were introduced with the election of Members to the European 
Parliament (1979), they did not prove strong enough to generate a 
coherent notion of Community citizenship. First, as legal scholar 
Carlos Closa argues, given the lack of legislative competence of the 
EP, the individual's condition as elector did not "reproduce the 
constitutional link between citize:O:s and the exercise of sovereignty 
characteristic of the concept of citizen. "14 And second, the condition of 
elector did not stem from subjection to EC law or a concept of single 
citizenship, but from the condition of national of a Member State. In 
other words, the rights provided by these changes to the EC 
legislative process still failed to untie the tight knot between 
nationality and political citizenship. Voting rights were limited to 
nationals or citizens of each State, and only exceptionally granted to 
13See Peter Leuprecht, "La Forteresse et les Droits de I'Homme", L'euenement Europeen, 11 (1990), 51-60 (p. 51). 14 . Closa, op.cit., p. 1144. 
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citizens of other Member States.15 As we shall see below, this 
reluctance to base voting rights on residence rather than nationality 
reflects a more general preference to reserve the political domain (the 
realm in which one can influence state policy) for one's own 
nationals.16 
Nevertheless, as the functions and jurisdiction of the European 
Community have expanded, giving it an increasingly "state-like" 
character, many constitutional lawyers have argued for an 
enrichment of the status accorded to individual Europeans.17 In 
addition to this legal reasoning, a rough idea of European citizenship 
has gradually coalesced around two practical realities: 1) the rights 
that the progressive completion of the internal market had granted to 
individuals, regardless of nationality (e.g., free movement); and 2) 
the increasing need to differentiate those individuals from citizens of 
non-member states. As a result, terms such as "Community citizen", 
"European citizen" or "Community national" have been coined to 
describe those persons subject to the ever-expanding jurisdiction of 
EC law. Today, this latter term - "Community national" - has become 
a formal Community concept, denoting a status to which the rights 
and benefits of European citizenship may be attached.18 With 
the Treaty on European Un.ion, negotiated in December 1991, the 
Community has endeavoured to formalise these rights of the 
European citizen. Citizenship of the Union is included in Part Two of 
the "Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community", which contains a catalogue of rights attached 
to the condition of citizen (Sa to 8d) and a procedure for further 
development of citizenship should current rights need to be 
strengthened or new ones added (Se). Article Sa grants to every 
citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of any Member State. On this point, the Treaty implies a 
broadening of the previous Community principles by removing the 
explicit link between free movement and the exercise of economic 
15only Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands gave "active rights" i.e. the right to vote- to 
residents who are citizens of another Member State. 
16cJosa, op.cit., p. 1145. . 
17AC. Evans, "Nationality law and European integration", European Law Review, 16, p. 197, 
in Closa, op.cit., p. 1145. 
18cJosa, op.cit., p. 1149. 
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activity. Article 8b is intended as a new expression of political 
citizenship, which recognises the right of every individual in the 
Union to vote and stand for election in the European Parliament and 
in municipal elections in the Member State is which he/she resides.19 
Article Se reproduces the principle of equality of treatment in the 
external dimension, by offering diplomatic protection to every citizen 
of the Union in the territory of a third country.20 And finally, the 
right of European citizens to petition the European Parliament and 
to appeal to an ombudsman is set out in Article 8d. 
There is a running debate as to whether these newly enshrined 
rights of European. citizenship were latent in existing treaties and 
intergovernmental bargains, or whether they have an autonomous 
character as one of the new bases of an emerging European political 
union and collective European identity. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that the rights of free movement and residence were already 
incipient in Articles 48, 51 and 52 of the Rome Treaty (even if certain 
categories of individuals were excluded, and even if residence was 
tied to ability to avoid becoming a burden for the social security 
system of the host Member State).21 On the other hand, many 
interpreters of the Maastricht Treaty insist that its provisions for 
European citizenship are meant to not only reflect economic reality, 
but also further the goals of political co-operation. In the Spanish 
Memorandum which preceded the intergovernmental negotiations, 
citizenship was defined as one of the three pillars of European 
political union, the other two being European Monetary Union and a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.22 Furthermore, in its Opinion 
l9voting rights are the only strictly political rights included in the Treaty. They fall well short 
of the Spanish government's proposals for more positive rights, such as freedom of expression, 
assoc1at10n and assembly, or the more general right of a citizen to take part in the political life 
of any Member State. See the Spanish Memorandum, Towards a Europeah Citizenship, Council 
Doe. SN 3940/90, 24 September 1990. 
20However, this right of diplomatic protection is not general or automatic. A citizen is only 
entitled to protection in a third country in which the Member State of which he or she is national 
is not represented. 
21rn Article 51, migrant workers and their dependants are entitled to welfare benefits 
vocational training and equal treatment in the matter of taxation and social rights. O~e could 
argue that these rights (e.g. non-discrimination and freedom of movement) were not newly 
created, but merely needed a juridical guarantee or improved provisions for their exercise. See 
Cl os a, op.cit., p. 1143. 
22rn the Spanish view, the creation of a new insta~ce of political power (i.e., the Union) requires 
a new definition of the rights and duties of the affected individuals. See Closa, op.cit., p. 1154. 
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of 21 October, 1990, the European Commission made clear that the 
development of a concept of European citizenship was central to its 
objective of strengthening democratic legitimacy and explicitly noted 
the exclusion of the "people of Europe" from the economic and 
neofunctionalist dynamic of the 1992 process. The Commission's 
contribution to the intergovernmental conferences therefore called for 
the establishment of targets for the civic, economic and social rights 
of European citizens,. which would be properly defined at a later 
stage.23 
In the final text which emerged at Maastricht, citizenship is 
listed as an objective of the Union, and not just a derivative of 
previous treaties. This wording gives European citizenship the legal 
character of "additionality": it is supplementary to rights and 
obligations attached to every national as a citizen of their own 
Member State. Consequently, in theory citizenship rights will be 
governed mainly by Community law and with the involvement of 
Community institutions.24 
In sum, the concept of European citizenship embodied in the 
Maastricht Treaty has institutionalised certain pre-existing 
Community rights, introduced· new ones, and provided a base for 
their further enlargement. From this point of view, it is a notable 
/advance from the Rome Treaty and Single European Act. 
L Nonetheless, although the Treaty has made great strides toward 
delineating the rights of a European citizen, its essentially political 
definition of citizenship suffers from four main defects: 1) it focuses 
solely on citizenship rights, without outlining a set of correspo~ding 
duties; 2) it is unclear whether such rights are meant to be 
codification of existing practice, or a catalyst for further European 
integration; 3) it is inherently exclusivist toward non--EC nationals, 
thereby raising further suspicions about the possibility of a "Fortress 
Europe"; and 4) it perpetuates a confusion between nationality and 
23Jbid., p. 1155. 
24See Article 8-2. As Closa notes, because the Treaty has still failed to establish proper 
Community procedures for the group of rights listed under 8b to 8d, their development will 
req_uire bringing into effect ad hoc laws, rules and conditions. Consequently, these rights could 
be 1mplemented through multilateral, intergovernmental agreements between Member States 
rather thap through Community legal instrumimts. (op.cit., p. 1159> 
l 
i 
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citizenship, by relying heavily on the conceptual framework of the 
nation-state. These weaknesses will ultimately restrict the ability of 
the legal notion of European citizenship to play a positive role in 
promoting a sense of common European identity-:' 
Rights without Duties 
In its classical form, citizenship was associated not only with the 
granting of rights, but also with outlining the individual's obligations 
and duties to society. From as early as Greek times, the image of the 
active citizen, with a duty to participate in the life of the polis, has 
been a fundamental component in theories of participatory 
democracy. Likewise, in the context of the eighteenth century, those 
few members of society which exercised the civil rights of citizenship 
were often motivated by a strong sense of "civic duty".25 And finally, 
in post-war Europe, the entitlements and benefits of the welfare state 
have also been accompanied by the duty to work, to pay taxes and 
insurance contributions, and to take part in military service. 
In current discussions of European citizenship, this dual nature 
of the citizen has been lost. The civil and political aspects of Union 
citizenship are one-dimensional, focused mainly on the rights that 
Europeans can exercise within the Community ambit. But what 
corresponding duties or obligations do European citizens have? To 
pay taxes? To subsidise the development of poorer areas? To offer 
service in a European defence force? 
Thus far, the minimalist Community right of free movement 
(beyond the liberties of free travel) has proven to be too thin to 
generate any corresponding sense of public duty. 'While in theory EC 
citizens are free to migrate, often they do not have the capacity - or 
the desire - to do so. It is therefore not surprising that those EC 
citizens who do not exercise this right complain that they are getting 
nothing out of the Community.26 Here, one only needs to look to the 
recent protests of French fishermen and farmers. 
25Marshall, op.cit., p. 123. For a comparison between civic humanism and modern-day 
republicanism, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975). 
u ' ' 
. European pohcy-makers have themselves become concerned about the popular perceptions of 
the benefits of increased integration. In this regard, the wording of a recent Community 
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As indicated above, the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty clearly 
hoped that European citizenship would expand beyond the economic 
requirements of free movement that were set out in the original 
Rome Trea:ty. Hence their decision to move from essentially civil 
rights (equality under the law) to political rights (voting in local 
elections). More significantly, their language consistently refers to 
the "dynamic" and "evolutionary" nature of citizenship rights. 
According to the Commission, European citizenship "reflects the aims 
of the Union, involving as it does an indivisible body of rights and 
obligations stemming from the gradual and coherent development of 
the Union's political, economic and social dimension."27 In Article Se 
of Maastricht, there is indication that the list of rights enshrined by 
the Treaty is not meant to be definitive; instead, the Commission has 
been entrusted with the task of overseeing the evolution of 
citizenship as new policy areas are transferred to the Union.28 
In the opinion of some, this dynamic character of citizenship 
could serve as a channel for incorporating more controversial social 
rights. The Spanish, for example, contend that a real political Union 
demands a more "meaty" interpretation of European citizenship - one 
that would overcome economic and social inequalities among 
individuals.29 Indeed, as the history of the late nineteenth century 
has shown, there is a logical link between political rights, the 
requirements of democracy and the granting of social entitlements. 
This is especially clear in arguments put forth for the right to a state-
funded education. Moreover, as Marshall's work illustrates the most 
' 
common method for establishing such social rights is through the 
exercise of political power. 30 
publication on European citizenship is particularly striking. "We may not be aware of it", the 
authors write, "but we all benefit on a daily basis from the emergent single market: access to a 
wide range of goods; competition which helps to keep prices down; policies to protect the 
consumer and environment; and standards usually harmonized al the highest level." (emphasis 
mine) See Pascal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Lessons (Luxembourg: European Documentation 
Centre, 1992), p. 24. 
27See "Union Citizenship". Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental 
~Snference SEC (91) 500 Bull EC Supp. 2/91., p. 87. Also cited in Closa, op.cit., p. 1168. 
The Commission will issue its first report by December 1993 (and every three years after) on 
the implementation of the provisions of Article 8. 
29see Spanish Memorandum, Towards a European Citizenship p 87 w . ' . . 
Marshail, op.cit., p. 90. 
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But to enrich European citizenship in this way, by moving 
along Marshall's continuum of civil, political and social rights, is to 
invite a host of new problems. The dilemmas of welfare capitalism, 
which Marshall notes in relation to the post-war European nation-
state, would potentially hold true for a European Community based 
on a substantive conception of citizenship rights. 
The first problem is the potential tension between a social 
conception of citizenship based on an ethic of egalitarianism, and a 
free market economy based on the logic of unequal gain. As Marshall 
demonstrates, the early civil rights of citizenship (e.g. the right of 
contract) were predominantly individual and therefore compatible 
with the functioning of a competitive market economy. But as 
citizenship expanded into the realms of the political and social, it 
gradually came into conflict with the economic system of capitalism. 
In his words: "The incentive that operates in the free contract system 
of the open market is the incentive of personal gain. The incentive 
that corresponds to social rights is that of public duty."31 A similar 
incompatibility may confront the European Community in its attempt 
to balance economic rights of citizenship - such as free movement -
with collective and social rights.32 
The second difficulty concerns the parameters of the "imagined 
political community". 33 Marshall observed that the boundaries of the 
national community had become too large to command a sense of 
loyalty or duty on the part of citizens, even with the existence of 
social rights.34 lVIoreover, as Anthony Smith has argued, all nation-
building projects ultimately require a base of common history and 
i ethnicity if they are to succeed.35 If these obstacles to identity 
formation are true for the nation-state, how much truer are they for 
31 Ibid., p. 126. 
32In terms of strict economic logic, the right of free movement is ultimately based on differential 
incomes and wages; otherwise, there would be no incentive to move. However, if social rights are 
incorporated into European citizenship, there will be greater equalization of incomes and 
perhaps less incentive to migrate. 
33This term is Benedict Anderson's. See Imagined Communities (London: Verso/New Left 
Books, 1983). 
34Marshall, op.cit., p. 129. 
35Anthony Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?", Millennium, 20 (1991), 
pp. 364-5. 
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a supranational entity such as the European Community? And, will 
they not become even more problematic as the Community 
contemplates expanding to include members from Eastern Europe?36 
In fact, the growing sense of alienation from national 
governments has led many Europeans to demand a greater degree of 
regional and local autonomy. Thus, at the precise moment when the 
sovereignty of the nation-state is being eroded from above, through 
the supra nationalist forces of integration, it is also under attack from 
within.37 All over Europe, from Lombardy to Brittany to Moravia, 
there is a resurgence of regional identity which encourages 
Europeans to focus their affections and obligations closer to home. 
Codifier or Catalyst? 
The current configuration of European citizenship is also 
ambiguous as to whether individuals rights are meant to be a 
codification of existing practice - much like granting a passport to a 
prospective national once she has memorised the national anthem -
or a catalyst for further European integration. More specifically, it is 
unclear whether the new pol~tical rights set out in Maastricht were 
enshrined in order to reflect and facilitate free movement, or to 
address the deeper problem of the "democratic deficit" within the 
Community. 
Here, it is interesting to study the reasoning used by EC 
officials concerning the right to vote. In a 1989 Resolution on voting 
rights in local elections, members of the EP argued that although the 
original Community treaty did not provide the necessary powers, 
complete equality of treatment between citizens, regardless of 
nationality or residence, was an essential Community objective. In 
other words, political citizenship (in the form of voting rights in local 
elections) was a natural outcome of the process of European 
36For a discussion of the "widening" vs. "deepening" debate, see Peter van Ham, The EC, 
Eastern Europe and European Unity: Discord, Collaboration and Integration Since 1947 
(London: Pinter, 1993). . 
37For an assessment of this recent preoccupation with a "Europe of the Regions", see David 
Marquand, "Nations, Regions and Europe", in National Identities, edited by Bernard Crick 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
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integration. ss The 1986 Single European Act, which added a political 
dimension to the official aims of the Community, gave further weight 
to this interpretation. The general commitment to democracy 
established in the Act Preamble allowed the Commission to argue 
that democratic participation by individuals within the Community 
was one of the ends to be achieved through Article 235. While the 
Commission excluded the question of voting in national elections, 
since it would impinge on national sovereignty, it contended that 
local elections did fall within the scope of the existing treaties. It 
therefore concluded "that Articles 235 and 236 of the Treaty provided 
enough legal basis for granting voting rights to any citizens from a 
Member State, regardless of his residence."39 
This focus on residence, rather than nationality, seems to 
coincide logically with the EC's commitment to facilitating free 
movement for all European citizens. However, by bringing the issue 
of the "democratic deficit" into its discussions of voting rights, the 
Community· has left many questions unanswered. First, as the 
theoretical distinctions between local, regional and national 
jurisdiction become increasingly blurred in practice, there may be 
louder calls to widen the voting power of European citizens to include 
national elections and referenda. And second, if one of the purposes 
of granting voting rights in local elections was to foster democratic 
participation, then it is unclear why this right has been granted only 
to nationals of states of the European Community. Indeed, if it is at 
the local level that decisions taken by governments most directly 
affect individuals, why should immigrants from non-EC states be 
treated any differently than immigrants from states within the 
Community? 
Fortress Europe 
This confusion concerning the expansion of political rights 
highlights a further problem with European citizenship: its 
potentially exclusivist impact. By extending voting rights only to 
nationals of Member States, the Community has sent a highly 
ambiguous message to those resident individuals who are outside the 
38Closa, op.cit., p. 1147. 
39Jbid .. , p. 1149. 
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legal parameters of the European Union. Have they been relegated 
to the status of "second-class citizens"? And if so, what does this 
preferential treatment say about the universality of European 
Community values? According to Council of Europe President Peter 
Leuprecht, the situation of foreigners in Western Europe is posing 
the greatest threat to the founding fathers' commitment to protecting 
and advancing individual human rights.40 
One could argue that this exclusivity is inherent in the very 
idea of citizenship itself. Because citizenship is a social status, 
contingent upon a pre-existing community, there are no universal 
principles which can set out its rights and duties. It is the particular 
community in question which must define them, and only for its 
particular members. Thus, the first question which must be asked _in 
all cases of citizenship is who is "in" and who is "out". 
This emphasis on membership and solidarity can lead to a kind 
of enforced unity. As Stephen Howe has noted, the community in 
which citizenship rights are exercised is often constructed "by 
rallying people against internal dissidents or external enemies. "41 In 
the past, there have been frequent attempts to create such a 
boundary between insiders and outsiders. Think, for example, of the 
French Constitution of 1791, which differentiated between "active 
citizens" (those who could influence the public domain) and "passive 
citizens" (those seen as contributing nothing to the public well-
being).42 In the present day, the exclusivist nature of citizenship is 
most often manifest in the drafting of immigration and nationality 
laws which place conditions and tests on aspiring citizens.43 
In today's states of Western Europe, attitudes and policies 
concerning the rights of foreigners exhibit a similar kind of 
protectionist mentality. Hostility against these 'Resident Others' is 
40Leuprecht, op.cit., p. 51. 
41stephen Howe, "Citizenship in the New Europe: A Last Chance for the Enlightenment?", in 
Andrews, op.cit., 123-35 (p. 130). 
42Andrews, op.cit., p. 13. In a similar way, a recent group of British scholars has tried to draw 
a line between active citizens, who are "successful, self-reliant, enterprising, consummg 
consuming and property-owning", and non-citizens, who are part of the "dependency culture". 
See Ruth Lister, The Exclusive Society: Citizenship and the Poor (London: Child Poverty Group, 
1990). 
43A pertinent example is Norman Tebbitt's suggestion that every aspiring British citizen should 
have to pass a cricket test. 
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especially strong if the fear of economic competition is combined with 
ethnic prejudice, as in the case of the North Mricans or Turks.44 It is 
important to remember that immigration itself is not a new 
phenomenon in Europe, and that the legislation of various European 
governments have displayed favouritism towards migrants coming 
from "culturally similar" environments.45 Nonetheless, as the recent 
events in Rostock have shown, the sense of resentment and paranoia 
regarding migrant peoples is not limited to those perceived to be 
civilisationally alien. The current flood of refugees from Eastern to 
Western Europe may be offering a new and more pressing case of 
backlash against non-citizens. "What the Maghreb is to France", 
writes Pierre Hassner, "the South and East of Europe are to 
Gennany and Austria."46 
Even in the policy declarations of the EC, there is a frequent 
tendency to conflate questions relating to foreigners and immigration 
on the one hand, with issues of crime, drugs, and terrorism on the 
other.47 In addition, there is a schizophrenic mindset which seeks 
champions the crumbling of borders within the European 
Community area, but which erects a "Fortress Europe" against 
nationals of third countries. This paradox can be seen clearly in the 
Schengen Agreement of 1985, which is meant to serve as a dress 
rehearsal for the Maastricht provisions for increased co-operation on 
immigration and refugee policy.48 The terms of Schengen have led to 
44see The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe,' edited by Tomas Gerholm and Yngve Georg 
Lithman (London: Mansell, 1988). 
45This discrimination is usually reflected in the administrative status given to an incoming 
refugee. While some have been granted formal refugee status according to the definition of the 
1951 Geneva Convention (e.g., East European refugees in the immedi-ate post-war penod), many 
Third World refugees have been treated as illegal migrants or accorded "humanitarian" or 
"tolerated status". The latter category protects refugees from refoulement, but provides them 
with few work travel or educational benefits and often leaves them in a state of administrative 
limbo. See Johan Cols, "Responses of European States to de facto Refuge·es", in Refugees and 
International Relations, edited by Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1989) 187-215. For a further comparison between post-war and contemporary immi~ration,policy, see Daniele Joly and Robin Cohen, "The 'New Refugees' of Europe", in 
Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees, edited by Daniele Joly and Robin Cohen (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1989), 5-18. 
46Pierre Hassner, "Culture and Society", International Spectator (1991), p. 150. 
47This confusion of thinking is particularly marked in the activities of the Trevi Group, an ad 
hoc consultative body composed of the ministers of Justice and Interior from the Twelve Member 
States. 
48The relevant portion of the Treaty is Article K (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of 
·Justice and Home Affairs). 
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strict controls at external frontiers which encourage people to resort 
to illegal immigration, as well as a more oppressive control of 
foreigners in their countries of residence. 49 
It is evident, then, that free movement is becoming a selective 
guiding principle for the Community. Moreover, there is a 
fundamental difference in attitude toward the inflow of people and 
the inflow of goods and capital.50 In the end, as Leuprecht points 
out, Europeans need to ask what kind of a common home they are 
seeking to construct. Will it be an open and outward looking 
Community that seeks to protect and promote diversity? Or, will it 
become a "fortress Europe where we can hide ourselves and our 
riches and defend ourselves from assault by the invaders?"51 
The paradox of the Community National 
This spectre of an introverted European Community leads 
directly to the fourth and final difficulty with the current expression 
·I of European citizenship: its strong reliance on the framework of the 
nation-state. Indeed, in almost all of the symbols chosen to represent 
the European Community - passport, flag, currency, anthem - the 
model of the nation-state and "nation-building" has loomed large in 
the background. 52 
/ 
According to Western constitutional tradition, citizens were 
those who were entitled to form the political subject, as distinct from 
those who enjoyed protection and rights of a more general kind. In 
the words of one legal scholar: "The essence of citizenship 
49Leuprecht, op.cit., pp. 56-9. 
50Robert Goodin, "If People were Money", in Free Movement, edited by Brian Barry et al (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), 6-22. Goodin accuses the European Commtmity of adopting a 
"communitarian" stance in its attitude to open borders and free movement: i.e., that different 
peoples are morally entitled to lead their lives in their own different ways, without undue 
influence from other communities organised on alternative or conflicting premises. For Goodin, 
moral consistency demands starting from a presumption of symmetry: "however free or 
constrained such movement is to be, it ought to be equally free or constrained in both directions 
and for both money as well as for people." (p. 19) 
51The danger of engendering ethno-centrism or an extreme "euro-patriotism" was noted by Euro 
MP's in their debates on European citizenship. See J.O.C.E Debats du Parlement Europeen, No. 
2-376, seance du 14 mars 1989, p. 98 et 15 mars, p. 180. 
52see the models developed by S. Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-
Building" in The Forntation of Nation-states in Wester Europe, edited by Charles Tilly (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19751. 
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<remained> the constitutional arrangements made for participation 
by a defined category of individuals in the life of the State."53 In 
domestic law, this enjoyment of political rights - and this ability to 
influence state policy - has been reserved almost exclusively to 
nationals. 
But is this same equation necessary for citizenship of the 
European Community? Is it true that a person cannot be a citizen of 
Europe without being a national of one of its Member States? Why 
not isolate residence, rather than nationality, as the criterion for the 
enjoyment of individual rights? As David Held suggests, the 
"historic moment seems to have passed for trying to define citizens' 
claims and entitlements in terms of membership in a national 
community."54 Now that sovereignty is increasingly being challenged 
- both from within and without - why not start from the presumption 
of individuals rather than nation-states?55 
The current stresses and strains within the integration process 
illustrate that Europe is not yet ready to abandon the nation-state in 
the name of supra nationalism or a collective European identity. To 
date, therefore, the European Community has opted to retain the 
close link between citizenship and nationality. As is evident in the 
wording of Article 8 (lJ of Maastricht56, the road to European 
citizenship is an indirect one, driving through the barrier of EC 
Member States. Lacking a strict definition of a citizen of the Union, 
nationality in any one of the Twelve becomes the requisite sine qua 
non for the enjoyment of the rights of European citizenship.57 
Furthermore, Member States will continue to decide who are to be 
considered their nationals for Community purposes and may amend 
this decision whenever they consider it necessary. 
Conclusion 
53Evans, "Nationality law", in Closa, op.cit., pp. 138-9. 
54Held, in Andrews, op.cit., pp. 24-5. 
55 Ironically, the fact that Members States of the EC had to change their national legislation to 
allow for voting rights in local elections demonstrates that national sovereignty can be and has 
already been infringed. 
56The article reads: "Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen 
of the Union". 
57 Closa, op.cit., pp. 1160-1. 
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While the European Community has been a pioneer in 
challenging us to think about new possibilities for shared sovereignty 
and joint decision-making, it is crucial to keep in mind its essentially 
intergovernmental rather than supranational character. As Closa 
writes, though the Maastricht Treaty upgrades the condition of 
citizens under Community law, "citizenship of the Union has not 
superseded nationality of the Member States, in much the same way 
as the European Union has not abolished the sovereign existence of 
the Member States."58 In the final analysis, the Community is still a 
long way from building a union among European peoples or a 
coherent European identity. Until it does, the decisive social and 
political status for individual Europeans is not European citizenship, 
but nationality in one of the Twelve. 
58Jbid., p. 1168. 
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